How to share knowledge by gossiping by Herzig, Andreas & Maffre, Faustine
  
   
Open Archive TOULOUSE Archive Ouverte (OATAO)  
OATAO is an open access repository that collects the work of Toulouse researchers and 
makes it freely available over the web where possible.  
This is an author-deposited version published in : http://oatao.univ-toulouse.fr/ 
Eprints ID : 16867 
The contribution was presented at EUMAS/AT 2015 :  
http://ai-group.ds.unipi.gr/eumas-at2015/eumas2015 
 
 
 
To cite this version : Herzig, Andreas and Maffre, Faustine How to share knowledge 
by gossiping. (2016) In: 13th International Conference on Agreement Technologies in 
European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS/AT 2015), 17 December 
2015 - 18 December 2015 (Athens, Greece). 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the repository 
administrator: staff-oatao@listes-diff.inp-toulouse.fr 
How to share knowledge by gossiping
Andreas Herzig and Faustine Maffre
University of Toulouse, IRIT
http://www.irit.fr/LILaC
Abstract. Given n agents each of which has a secret (a fact not known
to anybody else), the classical version of the gossip problem is to achieve
shared knowledge of all secrets in a minimal number of phone calls.
There exist protocols achieving shared knowledge in 2(n−2) calls: when
the protocol terminates everybody knows all the secrets. We generalize
that problem and focus on higher-order shared knowledge: how many
calls does it take to obtain that everybody knows that everybody knows
all secrets? More generally, how many calls does it take to obtain shared
knowledge of order k? This requires not only the communication of se-
crets, but also the communication of knowledge about secrets. We give
a protocol that works in (k+1)(n−2) steps and prove that it is correct:
it achieves shared knowledge of level k. The proof is presented in a dy-
namic epistemic logic that is based on the observability of propositional
variables by agents.
Keywords: gossip problem, shared knowledge, common knowledge, dynamic
epistemic logic
1 Introduction: the gossip problem and its generalization
The original version of the gossip problem goes as follows [1,9].
There are six agents each of which knows some secret not known to
anybody else. Two agents can make a telephone call and exchange all
secrets they know. How many calls does it take to share all secrets, i.e.,
how many calls have to take place until everybody knows all secrets?
The problem can be generalized from six to arbitrary numbers of agents n. In
the literature one can find various protocols achieving the goal in 2(n− 2) calls.
It has been proved that they are optimal: no protocol exists achieving the goal
with less calls [3,10,5].
There are contexts where the agents have to achieve higher-order knowledge,
typically in order to coordinate some joint action. While after 2(n−2) calls all
secrets are shared knowledge, they fail to be common knowledge. Unless every-
body knows the protocol and there is a global clock, such common knowledge
cannot be attained. More modestly, the agents may want to achieve second-order
shared knowledge: they may have the goal that everybody knows that everybody
knows all secrets. This paper investigates how such higher-order knowledge can
be achieved.
Let Agt be the set of all agents. Let us denote the secret of agent i by si. To
simplify things we suppose that si is a proposition that is true. Let us write Kiϕ
to express that agent i knows that the formula ϕ is true. The initial situation
before the agents start gossiping is expressed by
∧
i∈Agt
(
si ∧Kisi ∧
∧
j∈Agt,j 6=i
(
¬Kjsi ∧ ¬Kj¬si
))
and the formula ∧
i∈Agt
Ki
( ∧
j∈Agt
sj
)
expresses the goal that every agent knows every secret. Let us abbreviate the
conjunction
∧
j∈Agt sj of all secrets by All . Furthermore, let EKJϕ abbreviate
the conjunction
∧
i∈J Kiϕ, where J ⊆ Agt is an arbitrary nonempty subset of
Agt . So EKAgtAll expresses that all secrets are shared knowledge: every agent
knows every secret. EKAgtEKAgtAll expresses the goal that every agent knows
that all secrets are shared knowledge. The formula
EKAgt . . .EKAgt︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
All
expresses that all secrets are shared knowledge up to depth k ≥ 1.
The result of a phone call between two agents is that their knowledge in-
creases. Let us model this by means of modal operators of action: the for-
mula [Call ij ]ϕ expresses that ϕ is true after i and j talked to each other. Then
[Call ij ]EK{i,j}(si∧sj) expresses that the result of Call
i
j is that i and j know their
secrets. When we say that during a call the agents communicate all they know
then this not only concerns secrets, but also knowledge about secrets and more
generally higher-order knowledge. Therefore calls achieve common knowledge
between the calling agents, i.e.,
[Call ij ]EK{i,j} . . .EK{i,j}(si ∧ sj)
is the case for arbitrary nestings of EK{i,j}. Furthermore, the formula
[Call i1j1 ] . . . [Call
i2(n−2)
j2(n−2)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
2(n−2) times
EKAgtAll
expresses that the protocol where i1 calls j1 first, then i2 calls j2, . . . , and finally
i2(n−2) calls j2(n−2) achieves shared knowledge.
We note (k, n) the instance of the generalized gossip problem with n ≥ 2
agents and the goal to achieve depth k ≥ 1 of shared knowledge. So the original
problem corresponds to the instance (1, 6). We are going to introduce a proto-
col achieving shared knowledge of depth k in (k+1)(n−2) calls. Our proofs are
formally rigorous: they are couched in a dynamic epistemic logic that is called
DEL-PAO (Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assignment and Observa-
tion), with epistemic operators Ki, for i ∈ Agt , and dynamic operators [Call
i
j ],
for i, j ∈ Agt . We had introduced and studied that logic in [6], building on pre-
vious work by van der Hoek and colleagues [8,7]. We do not address the question
whether our protocol is optimal and leave that to future work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our algorithm. Section 3
recalls syntax and semantics of our dynamic epistemic logic DEL-PAO. In Section
4 we show how to capture the algorithm as a DEL-PAO program. In Section 5
we prove in DEL-PAO that the algorithm is correct. Section 6 concludes.
2 An algorithm achieving higher-order shared knowledge
The following algorithm generates a sequence of calls for a given instance (k, n) of
the generalized gossip problem, for k ≥ 1 and n ≥ 4. Throughout the algorithm
two of the agents, which we call left and right , will have a central, fixed role:
each of the other agents only communicates with either left or right . The n− 2
remaining agents will be numbered 0, 1, . . ., n−3.
The algorithm is made up of turns. During each turn, left and right col-
lect the secrets of other agents. Together with the last agent they talked to in
that turn, they thereby become what we call ‘semi-experts’. A further call be-
tween complementary semi-experts turns them into full experts. The last agents
left and right talked to play a crucial role. These two further semi-experts are
permuted at each turn in a way that will guarantee that the goal is reached.
Algorithm 1. For t = 0..k do
agent left calls agent 0−t (mod n−2);
agent left calls agent 1−t (mod n−2);
...
agent left calls agent n−3;
agent left calls agent 0;
agent left calls agent 1;
...
agent left calls agent n−4−t (mod n−2);
agent right calls agent n−3−t (mod n−2).
At the first turn (turn 0), agent left calls agent 0, then 1, . . . , then n−4, and
finally agent right calls agent n−3; at the second turn (turn 1), agent left calls
agent n−3, then 0, then 4, . . . , then n−5; and finally agent right calls agent
n−4; and so on. In the rest of the paper, we assume that every index of agent is
taken modulo n−2 and we omit “(mod n−2)”.
Figure 1 gives a visual representation of Algorithm 1: agents 0, 1, . . ., n−3
are put on a wheel which, between each turn, rotates clockwise. Agent left calls
everyone in ascending order, except the agent at the rightmost position of the
wheel, then right calls this agent.
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Fig. 1. Graphical represention of the first three turns of Algorithm 1.
So each turn involves n−2 calls, and overall the algorithm produces a se-
quence of (k+1)(n−2) calls.
Theorem 1. The instance (k, n) of the generalized gossip problem can be solved
in at most (k+1)(n−2) calls.
The rest of the paper is devoted to the proof of the above theorem: we are
going to establish that the sequence of calls produced by the algorithm is indeed
a solution. Our proof will be done in the formal language of DEL-PAO that we
introduce first.
3 Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assignment
and Observation DEL-PAO
Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assignment and Observation DEL-
PAO is grounded on the notion of observability of propositional variables. It
refines a logic that was proposed and studied in a series of papers by van der
Hoek, Wooldridge and colleagues under the names Epistemic Coalition Logic
of Propositional Control with Partial Observability ECL-PC(PO) [8] and Logic
of Revelation and Concealment LRC [7]. Basically the idea is that each agent
has a set of propositional variables she can observe: no different truth value is
possible for her. The other way round, any combination of truth values of the
non-observable variables is possible for her. In this section, we recall this logic;
more details can be found in [6].
3.1 Observability atoms
The atomic formulas of DEL-PAO are called visibility atoms and take the form
Si1 Si2 ...Sin p, where p is a propositional variable from a countable non-empty
set Prop and i1, i2, ..., in are agents from a finite non-empty set Agt . When n=0
then we have nothing but a propositional variable. For n=1, the atom Si1 p
reads “agent i1 sees the value of the variable p”, and for n=2, the second-order
observation Si1 Si2 p reads “agent i1 sees whether i2 sees the value of p”; and so
on. Beyond individual observability the language of DEL-PAO also accounts for
joint observability: the atom JSp reads “all agents jointly see the value of p”.
Metaphorically, joint attention about a propositional variable p is the case when
there is eye contact between the agents when observing p. Joint visibility implies
individual visibility: when a valuation contains JS p then it should also contain
Si p.
One can define first- and higher-order knowledge about literals by means of
conjunctions of visibility atoms. Indeed, for a propositional variable p we have
that agent i knows that p is true when p is true and i sees p. Similarly i knows that
p is false when p is false and i sees p. The list below collects some equivalences
that will be valid:
Kip↔ p ∧ Si p
Ki¬p↔ ¬p ∧ Si p
¬Kip ∧ ¬Ki¬p↔ ¬Si p
KjKip↔ p ∧ Si p ∧ Sj p ∧ Sj Si p
KjKi¬p↔ ¬p ∧ Si p ∧ Sj p ∧ Sj Si p
Formally the definition of observability atoms is as follows. First, the set of
observability operators is
OBS = {Si : i ∈ Agt} ∪ {JS},
where Si stands for individual visibility of agent i and JS stands for joint visibility
of all agents. The set of all sequences of visibility operators is noted OBS∗ and
the set of all non-empty sequences is noted OBS+. We use σ , σ ′, . . . for elements
of OBS∗. Finally, the set of atomic formulas is
ATM = {σ p : σ ∈ OBS∗, p ∈ Prop}.
The elements of ATM are also called visibility atoms, or atoms for short. For
example, JS S2 q reads “all agents jointly see whether agent 2 sees the value of
q”; in other words, there is joint attention in the group of all agents concerning
2’s observation of q. The elements of ATM are noted α, α′, . . . , β, β′, . . ..
3.2 Complex formulas
Beyond atomic formulas the language of DEL-PAO has epistemic operators as
well as actions, alias programs, assigning truth values to visibility atoms. It is
defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= α | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | CKϕ | [pi]ϕ
pi ::= +α | −α | pi;pi | pi ⊔ pi | ϕ?
where α ranges over ATM and i over Agt .
Our atomic programs are assignments of truth values to atoms from ATM :
+α makes α true and −α makes α false. Complex programs are constructed with
dynamic logic operators: pi;pi′ is sequential composition, pi⊔pi′ is nondeterministic
choice, and ϕ? is test. Just as in dynamic logic, the formula [pi]ϕ reads “after every
execution of pi, ϕ is true”. The formula Kiϕ reads “i knows that ϕ is true on the
basis of what she observes”, and CKϕ reads “all agents jointly know that ϕ is true
on the basis of what they jointly observe”. These epistemic operators account
for forms of individual and common knowledge that are respectively obtained
via individual observation and joint observation of facts. They therefore differ
conceptually from the classical operators of individual and common knowledge
as studied in the area of epistemic logic [4].
The other boolean operators ⊤, ⊥, ∨, → and ↔ are defined as abbreviations,
and K̂iϕ abbreviates ¬Ki¬ϕ. For J ⊆ Agt , the shared knowledge modality is
defined by
EKJϕ
def
=
∧
i∈J
Kiϕ
and the iteration of that operator is defined inductively for k ≥ 0 by EK0Jϕ = ϕ
and EKn+1J ϕ = EKJEK
n
Jϕ. Moreover, skip abbreviates ⊤? and fail abbreviates
⊥?. We also use the abbreviation pik, for k ≥ 0, inductively defined by pi0 = skip
and pik+1 = pik;pi. We sometimes drop set parentheses and, e.g., write EKi,jϕ
instead of EK{i,j}ϕ.
3.3 Introspective valuations
The models of DEL-PAO are simply sets of visibility atoms. In order to guarantee
positive and negative introspection we have to ensure that agents are always
aware of what they see: for every agent i and propositional variable p, Si Si p has
to be in every valuation. More generally, a valuation V is introspective when it
contains every visibility atom having two consecutive Si, such as Sj Si Si Sk p. So
in an introspective valuation an agent is aware of what she sees, every agent sees
this, and every agent sees that every agent sees this, etc.
Formally, a valuation V ∈ 2ATM is introspective if and only if the following
hold, for every α ∈ ATM and i ∈ Agt :
Si Si α ∈ V (C1)
JS JSα ∈ V (C2)
JS Si Si α ∈ V (C3)
if JSα ∈ V , then Si α ∈ V (C4)
if JSα ∈ V , then JS Si α ∈ V (C5)
The set of all introspective valuations is noted INTR.
(C1) is about introspection of individual sight: an agent always sees whether
she sees the value of an atom. (C2) requires the same for joint sight; indeed,
if JSα is true then JS JSα should be true by introspection, and if JSα is false
then all agents jointly see that at least one of them has broken eye contact. (C3)
forces the first to be common knowledge. (C4) guarantees that joint visibility
implies individual visibility. Together with (C2), (C5) guarantees that JSα ∈ V
implies JSσ α ∈ V for σ ∈ OBS∗.
The constraints (C4) and (C5) ensure that JSα ∈ V implies σ α ∈ V for
σ ∈ OBS+. This motivates the following relation of introspective consequence be-
tween atoms: α ❀ β iff either α = β, or α = JSα′ and β = σ α′ for some σ ∈
OBS+. Closure under introspective consequence characterizes introspective val-
uations.
Proposition 1 ([6]). A valuation V ⊆ ATM is introspective if and only if, for
every α, β ∈ ATM and i ∈ Agt :
σ Si Si α ∈ V for every σ ∈ OBS
∗ (1)
σ JSα ∈ V for every σ ∈ OBS+ (2)
if α ∈ V and α❀ β then β ∈ V (3)
An atom α ∈ ATM is valid in INTR if and only if α belongs to every
valuation in INTR. By Proposition 1, α is valid in INTR if and only if α is of
the form either σ Si Si α with σ ∈ OBS
∗, or σ JSα with σ ∈ OBS+.
Indistinguishability relations between valuations. Two valuations are re-
lated by the indistinguishability relation for agent i, noted ∼i, if every α that
i sees has the same value. Similarly, we have a relation ∼Agt for joint indistin-
guishability. They are defined as follows:
V∼iV
′ iff Si α ∈ V implies V (α) = V
′(α)
V∼AgtV
′ iff JSα ∈ V implies V (α) = V ′(α)
where we write V (α) = V ′(α) when α has the same truth value in V and V ′,
i.e., when either α ∈ V and α ∈ V ′, or α /∈ V and α /∈ V ′.
It is proven in [6] that the binary relations ∼i and ∼Agt are equivalence
relations on the set of introspective valuations INTR and that valuations in
INTR are not related to valuations outside of INTR by ∼i and ∼Agt .
Truth conditions and validity. Given an introspective valuation V , update
operations add or remove atoms from V . This requires some care because the
resulting valuation should be be introspective. For example, removing Si Si p
should be impossible. Another example is when V does not contain Si p: then
V ∪ {JS p} would violate (C4). So when adding an atom to V one also has to
add all its positive consequences. Symmetrically, when removing an atom one
also has to remove its negative consequences. Let us define the following:
Eff +(α) = {β ∈ ATM : α❀ β}
Eff −(α) = {β ∈ ATM : β ❀ α}
Clearly, when V is introspective then both V ∪Eff +(α) and V \Eff −(α) are so,
too (unless α is valid).
Now the truth conditions are as follows:
V |= α iff α ∈ V
V |= ¬ϕ iff V 6|= ϕ
V |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff V |= ϕ and V |= ψ
V |= Kiϕ iff V
′ |= ϕ for all V ′ such that V ∼i V
′
V |= CKϕ iff V ′ |= ϕ for all V ′ such that V ∼Agt V
′
V |= [pi]ϕ iff V ′ |= ϕ for all V ′ such that V RpiV
′
where Rpi is a binary relation on valuations that is defined (by mutual recursion
with the definition of |=) by:
V R+αV
′ iff V ′ = V ∪ Eff +(α)
V R−αV
′ iff V ′ = V \ Eff −(α) and α is not valid in INTR
V Rpi1;pi2V
′ iff there is U such that V Rpi1U and URpi2V
′
V Rpi1⊔pi2V
′ iff V Rpi1V
′ or V Rpi2V
′
V Rϕ?V
′ iff V = V ′ and V |= ϕ
The relation Rpi is defined just as in PDL for the program operators ;, ⊔
and ?. The interpretation of assignments is designed in a way such that we
stay in INTR: the program +α adds all the positive consequences of α; the
program −α fails if α is valid in INTR and otherwise removes all the negative
consequences of α. For example, we never have V R−S1 S1 pV
′, i.e., the program
−S1 S1 p always fails. In contrast, the program −S1 S2 p always succeeds, and
we have V R−S1 S2 p (V \ {S1 S2 p, JS S2 p, JS p}) because the only atoms—beyond
S1 S2 p itself—whose consequence is S1 S2 p are JS S2 p and JS p. Therefore V 6|=
[−S1 S2 p]JS p for every V .
Like ∼i and ∼Agt , it is proven in [6] that valuations in INTR are only related
to valuations in INTR by Rpi. Therefore there is no risk to “go out” of the set of
introspective valuations with modal operators.
A model of ϕ is a valuation V such that V |= ϕ. A formula ϕ is satisfiable in
INTR if ϕ has an introspective model. For example, JS p ∧ ¬Si p has a model,
but does not have an introspective model and is therefore unsatisfiable in INTR.
A formula ϕ is valid in INTR if if every introspective valuation is a model of
ϕ. We also say that ϕ is a validity of DEL-PAO. For example, ¬[−S1 S2 p]JS p is
valid in INTR, and ¬β → [+α]¬β is valid in INTR if and only if α 6❀ β.
4 Expressing calls in the language of DEL-PAO
The logic DEL-PAO provides a suitable framework to model calls between agents
and to reason about the evolution of their knowledge. Before the proof of cor-
rectness of our algorithm, we show how to express calls and we give some of their
properties.
In the protocols for the standard version of the gossip problem, agents only
communicate their factual knowledge during a call. In order to achieve higher-
order knowledge they also have to tell what they know about others: for shared
knowledge of level k they have to exchange all their knowledge up to depth k−1.
Formally, let the level k of intended shared knowledge be given. Let i and
j be two agents. For a given integer m, let the set all nonempty sequences of
visibility operators Si and Sj of length at most k−m be {σ1, . . . , σl}. For example,
for k = 3 and m = 1 that set is {Si, Sj , Si Si, Si Sj , Sj Si, Sj Sj}. Then Call
i
j is the
sequential composition of programs of the form
(
KiKy1Ky2 . . .Kyms ∨KjKy1Ky2 . . .Kyms?;+σ1Sy1 . . . Sym s; . . . ; +σlSy1 . . . Sym s
)
⊔ ¬(KiKy1Ky2 . . .Kyms ∨KjKy1Ky2 . . .Kyms)?
for secret s in {si : i ∈ Agt}, integer m ≤ k−1, and agents 〈y1, . . . , ym〉 ∈ Agt
m.
For example, for k = 3 the following is an element of the sequence:
(
KiKys ∨KjKys?;+Si Sy s; +Sj Sy s; +Si Si Sy s; +Si Sj Sy s; +Sj Si Sy s; +Sj Sj Sy s
)
⊔ ¬(KiKys ∨KjKys)?
That piece of program tests whether Kys is known by i or j and if so makes Sy s
visible for both i and j and i’s observation of Sy s visible for j, and vice versa;
when neither i nor j knows Kys then the first test KiKys∨KjKys? fails and the
second test ¬(KiKys ∨ KjKys)? succeeds and the program does nothing. We
observe that the additions +Si Si Sk s and +Sj Sj Sk s are trivial because they
are introspectively valid.
Some properties of the program Call ij and its interaction with the shared
knowledge operator will be useful in our proofs.
First of all, the dynamic operators [Call ij ] and the shared knowledge oper-
ators EKJ are normal modal operators. So in particular [Call
i
j ]ϕ ∧ [Call
i
j ]ψ ↔
[Call ij ](ϕ∧ψ) and (EKJϕ∧EKJψ)↔ EKJ(ϕ∧ψ) are DEL-PAO valid. Moreover,
we can put coalitions together: the schema
(EKJ1ϕ ∧ EKJ2ϕ)↔ EKJ1∪J2ϕ
is valid for every J1, J2 ⊆ Agt . (To see this reduce EK according to its definition.)
Finally, calls preserve positive knowledge and produce shared knowledge, which
is a property that we state formally:
Proposition 2. Let s ∈ {si : i ∈ Agt} and m ≥ 0. Let ϕ be of the form either
Ki1 . . .Kims or EKJ1 . . .EKJms. Then:
1. ϕ→ [Call ij ]ϕ is DEL-PAO valid;
2. Kiϕ→ [Call
i
j ]EK
k−m
{i,j}ϕ is DEL-PAO valid.
Finally, the program corresponding to the turn t of Algorithm 1 is:
turnt = Call
left
n−2−t; . . . ;Call
left
n−3;Call
left
0 ; . . . ;Call
left
n−4−t;Call
right
n−3−t.
5 Correctness of the algorithm
We now prove that the algorithm returns a solution. The dynamic modalities of
DEL-PAO nicely allow to express that a further call would turn an agent i into
an expert, i.e., that i is a semi-expert.
Let Agt = {left , right , 0, . . . , n−3} be the set of agents and Prop = {si :
i ∈ Agt} the set of propositional variables. The initial state is modeled by the
valuation
w0 = {si : i ∈ Agt} ∪ {Si si : i ∈ Agt} ∪ {α : α is valid in INTR}.
So all secrets are true, each agent knows its own secret, and moreover the intro-
spectively valid atoms are true. We have:
w0 |=
∧
i∈Agt
Ki
(
si ∧
∧
j∈Agt,j 6=i
¬Kjsi
)
.
An agent is an expert for depth t if its personal goal for depth t is reached.
Precisely, at w agent i is an expert for depth t ≥ 1 if and only if
w |= KiEK
t−1
AgtAll .
Two agents i and j are complementary for depth t (‘semi-experts’), noted complt(i, j),
if a call between i and j would make them both experts for depth t. More for-
mally:
complt(i, j)
def
= [Call ij ]EKi,jEK
t−1
AgtAll .
Furthermore, two pairs of agents (i1, i2) and (j1, j2) are complementary for depth
t at valuation w if and only if
w |= complt(i1, j1) ∧ complt(i1, j2) ∧ complt(i2, j1) ∧ complt(i2, j2).
We will prove that at each turn, two pairs of agents are complementary: the
first pair is agent left along with the last agent she called at this turn, and the
second is agent right along with the last (and only agent) she called at this turn.
The first turn is a special case where semi-experts of depth 1 are produced.
Lemma 1. We have:
w0 |= [turn0]
(
EKleft,n−4(sleft∧s0∧ . . .∧sn−4) ∧ EKright,n−3(sright∧sn−3)
)
.
Proof. Let us write ij for the call between i and j. The first turn (turn 0) of
Algorithm 1 produces the following sequence of calls:
left0, left1, . . . , left(n−4), right(n−3).
By Proposition 2.2 we have w0 |= [Call
left
0 ]EKleft,0(sleft∧s0) and therefore
w0 |= [Call
left
0 ]Kleft(sleft∧s0). We do the same for the next call:
w0 |= [Call
left
0 ][Call
left
1 ]EKleft,1(sleft∧s0∧s1)
⇒ w0 |= [Call
left
0 ][Call
left
1 ]Kleft(sleft∧s0∧s1).
And so on until:
w0 |= [Call
left
0 ][Call
left
1 ] . . . [Call
left
n−4]EKleft,n−4(sleft∧s0∧s1∧ . . .∧sn−4).
In the same vein we also have w0 |= [Call
right
n−3 ]EKright,n−3(sright∧sn−3).
By Proposition 2.1 we then obtain:
w0 |= [Call
left
0 ] . . . [Call
left
n−4][Call
right
n−3 ]
(
EKleft,n−4(sleft∧s0∧ . . .∧sn−4) ∧ EKright,n−3(sright∧sn−3)
)
⇔ w0 |= [turn0]
(
EKleft,n−4(sleft∧s0∧ . . .∧sn−4) ∧ EKright,n−3(sright∧sn−3)
)
.
We now characterize the turns after turn0.
Lemma 2. For t ≥ 1, we have:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt]
(
EKleft,n−4−tEKleft,0−t,...,n−4−tEK
t−1
AgtAll∧
EKright,n−3−tEKright,n−3−tEK
t−1
AgtAll
)
.
Proof. We use by induction on t. Both cases resemble the proof of Lemma 1.
Base case: t = 1. The turn 1 of Algorithm 1 produces the following sequence:
left(n−3), left0, left1, . . . , left(n−5), right(n−4).
By Lemma 1 and Proposition 2.2 we have:
w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3]EKleft,n−3EKleft,n−3All ,
from which follows:
w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3]KleftEKleft,n−3All .
Then again by Proposition 2.2:
w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3][Call
left
0 ]EKleft,0EKleft,n−3,0All
⇒ w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3][Call
left
0 ]KleftEKleft,n−3,0All ,
and for the next call:
w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3][Call
left
0 ][Call
left
1 ]EKleft,1EKleft,n−3,0,1All
⇒ w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3][Call
left
0 ][Call
left
1 ]KleftEKleft,n−3,0,1All ,
and so on until:
w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3][Call
left
0 ][Call
left
1 ] . . . [Call
left
n−5]EKleft,n−5EKleft,n−3,0,1,...,n−5All .
Similarly we have:
w0 |= [turn0][Call
right
n−4 ]EKright,n−4EKright,n−4All .
Finally we obtain the result by Proposition 2.1:
w0 |= [turn0][Call
left
n−3][Call
left
0 ] . . . [Call
left
n−5][Call
right
n−4 ]
(
EKleft,n−5EKleft,n−3,0,1,...,n−5All
∧ EKright,n−4EKright,n−4All
)
⇔ w0 |= [turn0][turn1]
(
EKleft,n−5EKleft,n−3,0,1,...,n−5All
∧ EKright,n−4EKright,n−4All
)
.
Inductive case. The reasoning is similar, but generalized to turn t+1. Suppose
the formula is true for turn t. The turn t+ 1 is:
left(n−3−t), left(0−t), . . . , left(n−5−t), right(n−4−t).
By our induction hypothesis and Proposition 2.2 we have:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
left
n−3−t]EKleft,n−3−tEKleft,n−3−tEKAgtEK
t−1
AgtAll ,
that is:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
left
n−3−t]EKleft,n−3−tEKleft,n−3−tEK
t
AgtAll ,
which implies:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
left
n−3−t]KleftEKleft,n−3−tEK
t
AgtAll .
Then by Proposition 2.1:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
left
n−3−t][Call
left
0−t]EKleft,0−tEKleft,n−3−t,0−tEK
t
AgtAll
⇒ w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
left
n−3−t][Call
left
0−t]KleftEKleft,n−3−t,0−tEK
t
AgtAll ,
. . . and so on until:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
left
n−3−t][Call
left
0−t] . . . [Call
left
n−5−t]
EKleft,n−5−tEKleft,n−3−t,0−t,...,n−5−tEK
t
AgtAll .
Moreover, by Proposition 2.2:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
right
n−4−t]EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEKAgtEK
t−1
AgtAll ,
that is:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
right
n−4−t]EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEK
t
AgtAll .
We end as usual with Proposition 2.1:
w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][Call
left
n−3−t] . . . [Call
left
n−5−t][Call
right
n−4−t](
EKleft,n−5−tEKleft,n−3−t,...,n−5−tEK
t
AgtAll ∧
EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEK
t
AgtAll
)
⇔ w0 |= [turn0; . . . ; turnt][turnt+1](
EKleft,n−5−tEKleft,n−3−t,...,n−5−tEK
t
AgtAll ∧
EKright,n−4−tEKright,n−4−tEK
t
AgtAll
)
,
which is our result for t+ 1.
Lemma 3. After the turn t − 1 of Algorithm 1, the pairs (left , n−3−t) and
(right , 0−t) are complementary for depth t.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we can deduce:
w0 |= [turn0, . . . , turnt−1]
(
KleftEKleft,1−t,...,n−3−tEK
t−2
AgtAll ∧
KrightEKright,0−tEK
t−2
AgtAll
)
.
Applying Proposition 2.2 we obtain:
w0 |= [turn0, . . . , turnt−1][Call
left
right ]EKleft,rightEKAgtEK
t−2
AgtAll ,
that is:
w0 |= [turn0, . . . , turnt−1][Call
left
right ]EKleft,rightEK
t−1
AgtAll ,
which is equivalent to:
w0 |= [turn0, . . . , turnt−1]complt(left , right).
Following the same reasoning for left and 0−t, right and n−3−t, and finally
n−3−t and 0−t, we obtain that each of them are complementary, hence the
result.
Lemma 4. The goal for depth t, EKtAgtAll , is reached after the turn t of Algo-
rithm 1.
Proof. The turn t of Algorithm 1 is:
left(0−t), left(1−t), . . . , left(n−4−t), right(n−3−t).
By Lemma 3, after the turn t− 1 and the first call left(0−t) of turn t, agents
left and 0−t become experts for depth t. (Thus EKleft,0−tEK
t−1
AgtAll .)
Then, after the n−4 calls left(1−t), . . . , left(n−4−t) we get by Proposition
2.2:
K1−tEK
t−1
AgtAll ∧ . . . ∧Kn−4−tEK
t−1
AgtAll ,
that is, 1−t, . . ., n−4−t are all experts for depth t.
Finally, after the last call right(n−3−t), and also by Lemma 3, agents right
and n−3−t become experts for depth t. (Thus EKright,n−3−tEK
t−1
AgtAll .)
Therefore after the n−2 calls of the turn t we have EKAgtEK
t−1
AgtAll , which
is equivalent to EKtAgtAll .
Proposition 3. The sequence resulting from Algorithm 1 gives a solution to the
generalized gossip problem.
Proof. By Lemma 4, the goal for depth t is reached after turn t of Algorithm 1.
Thus the goal for depth k is reached after turn k (k + 1 turns), i.e., at the end
of the algorithm.
6 Conclusion
We have provided a logical analysis of the gossip problem, focusing on how
higher-order shared knowledge can be obtained. We did so in a particular dy-
namic epistemic logic: Dynamic Epistemic Logic of Propositional Assignment
and Observation DEL-PAO. Its integration of knowledge modalities and dynamic
modalities provides a handy language in order to reason about concepts such as
an agent being a semi-expert, which is pivotal in our algorithm.
The gossip problem recently attracted quite some attention in the dynamic
epistemic logic community [2]. We believe that our generalization—as well as
further variations where e.g. calls can only be made according to some graph
structure—provide interesting, canonical multiagent planning problems that can
be compared to the blocksworld in classical planning.
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